PUBLISHED DECISIONS
- BELL V. BELL
CIVIL PROCEDURE - Jurisdiction over the person
2004-CA-001350
PUBLISHED
JUDGE: KNOPF
AFFIRMING
Date: 10/28/2005
This appeal arose over a dispute over entitlement to insurance proceeds paid to the decedent's ex-wife. John and Wanda were divorced in Kentucky; Wanda moves to Florida; John remarries Susan; John changes his life insurance beneficiary from Wanda to John; John dies; life insurance company says John filled out the form improperly; Wanda completes the life insurance application for the proceeds and pays them to Wanda. All heck breaks out, and Susan as administratrix of John's estate files suit for declaratory judgment and to impose constructive trust on the proceeds received by Wanda and includes John's children as parties.
Wanda makes a 'special' appearance raising lack of personal jurisdiction. Trial court agrees and dismissed actions. COA affirms. Wanda the ex-wife's contacts with Kentucky are insufficient to warrant the exercise of personal jurisdiction over her.COA lays out some black-letter law on personal jurisdiction as follows:
Kentucky has adopted a three-pronged jurisdictional test to determine personal jurisdiction. Wilson v. Case, Ky., 85 S.W.3d 589 (2002). This test creates a “workable three-pronged analysis to determine the outer limits of personal jurisdiction based upon a single act.” Id. at 593. The three prongs of the accepted test for personal jurisdiction are: (1) whether the defendant purposefully availed “[herself] of the privilege of acting within the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum state;” (2) whether the cause of action arose “from the alleged in-state activities;” and (3) whether the defendant has “such connections to the state as to make jurisdiction reasonable.” Id. At 593 (citing Tube Turns Div. Of Chemetron Corp v. Patterson Co., Inc., Ky.App., 562 S.W.2d at 100). “Each of these three criteria represents a separate requirement, and jurisdiction will lie only where all three are satisfied.” Wilson at 593.
To determine whether this Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant pursuant to KRS 454.210, this Court must first look to the three-prong test set forth in Wilson. Though the three-prong test is not dispositive of the inquiry into minimum contacts in this case, it determines the outer limits of personal jurisdiction. Wilson at 593. As stated earlier, this Court believes the Wilson test is not satisfied because this action did not arise out of any alleged in-state activity on the part of Giangrosso.
Kentucky’s long arm statute, “allows Kentucky courts to reach to the full constitutional limits of due process in entertaining jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. At the same time, the limits of due process serve as a safeguard to ensure that state courts comply with federal constitutional requirements. Therefore, Kentucky’s jurisdictional reach cannot exceed those prescribed limits.” Wilson at 593.
Comment: This case demonstrates what happens when you are a dollar short and a day late. Presumably, the funds were distributed before Susan could contact an attorney and take action. Personal jurisdiction would have existed over the insurer who sold a policy to the Kentucky insured. Since the policy was with the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance, then jurisdiction might even have vested in federal court and/or involved a federal question. However, you fight the war with the Army you have and not the Army you wished you had - you fight the case with the facts you have and not with the facts that could've been.
- LOUISVILLE METRO HOUSING AUTHORITY V. BURNS
DAMAGES - PunitIve (against taxpayer funded government agency)
2004-CA-001489
PUBLISHED
JUDGE: TACKETT
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING AND REMANDING IN PART
Date: 10/28/2005
The Louisville Metro Housing Authority appeals from a judgment based upon a jury verdict awarding appellee Julius Burns $500,000.00 in compensatory damages and $3,000,000.00 in punitive damages stemming from injuries he sustained through exposure to lead in and about the Authority’s public housing complex in which he resided throughout his childhood. The Authority alleged that 1) that the trial judge erred in allowing the issue of punitive damages to be presented to the jury; and 2) that the compensatory damage award was predicated solely upon impermissible speculation as to appellee’s loss of future income.
Although COA found no error in evidence adduced to support the compensatory damage verdict, it held it was error to allow the issue of punitive damages against a taxpayer-funded government agency to be presented to the jury.
- BAKER V. CAMPBELL COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION
EMPLOYMENT - Retaliatory Failure to Hire (Not recognized in Ky.)
TORTS - No cause of action for retaliatory failure to hire
2004-CA-001928
PUBLISHED
JUDGE:MINTON
AFFIRMING
Date: 10/28/2005
Baker was not hired by the school board and he claimed the Board refused to hire him as punishment for his having successfully sued the Board in federal court.
In dismissing the action, the circuit court correctly ruled that Kentucky does not recognize a common law cause of action for retaliatory failure to hire. COA agreed, affirmed the dismissal, and "decline[d] Baker’s invitation to adopt the cause of action in Kentucky.
- HOWARD V. CITY OF INDEPENDENCE
EMPLOYMENT LAW - Government Employee (Removal, Police Officer)
2004-CA-001020
PUBLISHED
JUDGE: HENRY
AFFIRMING
Date: 10/28/2005
Affirmed summary judgment dismissing police captain's complaint for termination of employment alleging among other things a denial for his request for a public hearing. Held police officers “are not non-elected officers for purposes of Independence Code of Ordinances at §31.35(C) which requires a specific due process hearing for removal”.
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